CEOs often receive pensions that provide life annuities of up to 60% of their final salary plus bonus. I investigate the extent to which pensions are managerial rent extraction and/or the result of optimal contracting between CEOs and boards of directors. Specifically, I examine whether CEOs exploit limited disclosure requirements to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits and whether pensions are associated with CEO power and/or contracting determinants. Overall, my results provide some support for both the managerial power and optimal contracting views of pensions. Economic contracting variables, however, appear to explain pension benefit levels to a greater extent than measures of CEO power. This suggests that although pensions can be used to extract rent, this practice appears to be limited. In addition, my results suggest that pension-based rent extraction can be detected using public disclosures, implying that recent SEC changes in pension disclosure requirements are likely to have little effect on investors' ability to value pensions.
Introduction
CEO compensation has long been a major focus of accounting research. Although this research provides considerable evidence on annual bonuses and stock options, it rarely considers benefits such as pensions. But revelations of large, poorly disclosed pensions such as the $750 thousand monthly payment that General Electric offered its former CEO, Jack Welch, raise important questions about the level and precision of pension disclosures and the role of pensions in CEO contracts.
Questions such as these prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to implement significant regulatory changes in compensation disclosures, including pensions. As of December 15, 2006, the SEC requires firms to disclose in proxy statements the annual accrual of pension benefits and the present value of accrued pension benefits for each of a firm's top five executives. Although these changes increase the level of pension disclosures and the penalties for disclosures that are false, misleading, and/or of poor quality, firms continue to exercise discretion in the disclosure of pension benefits (Den Uyl and Frederick 2006; Scannell and Lublin 2006) .
The changes in SEC disclosure requirements are consistent with the view of some commentators, institutional investors, and academics that pensions offer substantially greater opportunities for managerial rent extraction than other compensation mechanisms (e.g., Colvin 2001; Bebchuk et al. 2002; Hodgson 2004) . Proponents of this "Managerial Power View" make two arguments against CEO pensions. First, limited disclosure requirements enable CEOs to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits. Second, CEOs with power over their boards of 1 directors extract rent through pensions because pension payments are less observable and less sensitive to performance than other forms of long term compensation.
An alternative view, from the economics and finance literature, is that boards of directors represent the interests of shareholders and therefore structure contracts to meet the CEO's reservation wage, to minimize agency costs, and to minimize joint tax burdens (e.g., Core et al. 2005) . According to this "Optimal Contracting View," boards substitute pensions for other forms of compensation and incentives when pensions provide optimal incentives and/or minimize joint tax burdens (e.g., Lazear 1979; Scholes et al. 2002; Edmans 2006) . This view implies that contracting determinants (e.g., firm-level economic factors, tax rates, labor market conditions) primarily determine the provision and disclosure of CEO pension benefits.
Given these conflicting views on CEO pensions, I examine the determinants of CEO pensions and the associations between CEO pensions, disclosure choices, and excess compensation. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which discretionary disclosures are associated with excess pension benefits, and the relation between pensions and CEO power and/or contracting determinants.
Using both proprietary data and public disclosures under the pre-2007 regulations, I
examine the difference between pension valuations estimated using full information on plan characteristics, and valuations using only public disclosures and common valuation assumptions. I find that firm disclosures that exclude key plan characteristics lead to downwardly biased estimates of pension benefits in some cases. But even using the pre-2007 disclosure requirements, the biases are small in the vast majority of cases, suggesting that SEC disclosure changes are likely to have little effect on investors' ability to value pensions.
Moreover, the evidence indicates that CEOs do not pursue disclosure policies that hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits.
I find that contracting variables are the primary determinants of pension benefit levels, but find mixed support for the claim that more powerful CEOs receive higher pension benefit levels. Even if disclosures lead to biased estimates of pension values and pension benefit levels are higher than expected, these facts have little impact on shareholders if they do not lead to excessive total compensation. I therefore investigate whether pensions are associated with total excess compensation. Although economic factors are the primary determinants of pension benefit levels, I find a positive association between pensions and excess compensation, consistent with the Managerial Power View that pensions can be used to extract additional rents.
Overall, my results provide some support for both the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Views. Economic contracting variables, however, appear to explain the variation in pension benefit levels to a greater extent than measures of CEO power. This suggests that although pensions can be used for rent extraction in some cases, this practice appears to be limited. In addition, my disclosure results suggest that rent extraction can be detected using public disclosures.
This study makes two contributions. First, in light of recent regulatory changes, it provides insight into the level and precision of compensation disclosures. Second, this study contributes to the literature on agency problems and executive compensation by investigating the relative ability of the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Views to explain the level and mix of pensions in CEO contracts.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background on CEO pensions. Section 3 develops the hypotheses and Section 4 discusses the samples and empirical measures. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background
Firms often grant CEOs pensions that provide life annuities of up to 60% of their final average salary plus bonus (Sundaram and Yermack 2006) . Pensions supplement other retirement benefits (e.g., deferred compensation and defined contribution plans), but are typically larger in monetary terms and do not require explicit ongoing contributions from participants (Clark Consulting 2005).
Pensions come in two forms: qualified plans and non-qualified plans. The Department of Labor regulates qualified plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). ERISA prohibits qualified plans from providing benefits on salaries greater than $220,000 and dictates minimum funding levels and participation requirements. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") insures qualified plans against firm bankruptcy. In addition, qualified plans receive beneficial tax treatment: firms can fund qualified plans and receive a current tax deduction without imposing an immediate tax liability on the participant.
Non-qualified plans do not receive beneficial tax treatment. If a firm funds a nonqualified plan, the plan must be at risk of firm bankruptcy to avoid imposing an immediate tax liability on the participant. Most non-qualified plans are therefore unfunded. Non-qualified plans are not insured by the PBGC and are not subject to ERISA maximum benefit, funding, and participation requirements.
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There are two types of non-qualified plans: restoration plans and supplemental executive retirement plans ("SERPs"). Restoration plans provide benefits on salaries above the $220,000 ERISA limit using the same formula as an associated qualified plan. SERPs calculate retirement benefits using formulas that differ from those of qualified plans.
Qualified and non-qualified plans are not mutually exclusive. Some firms include top executives in broad based qualified plans up to the ERISA salary limit, and then provide additional benefits using non-qualified plans. In this study, I examine total benefits provided to the CEO under all plans.
Qualified plans, restoration plans, and SERPs calculate annual retirement payments as a percentage of final average earnings for either the last three or five years of employment. Final average earnings for qualified and restoration plans include base salary, while final average earnings for SERPs most often include base salary and annual bonus. Plans generally calculate the annual retirement payment as 1.5-2.5% multiplied by the service years credited. Some firms cap payments at 50-60% of final average earnings.
CEOs typically accrue one service year per employment year. Some firms, however, grant multiple service years to new hires or to CEOs who are leaving office (Yermack 2006 Table. At that time, the ten year BBB rate was 6.20% and the 30 year US Treasury rate was 3.25%.
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Compensation Table. If the firm based payments on a mechanism other than service years and final average earnings, the SEC required a narrative explanation. Appendix A provides these disclosure requirements.
For proxy statements filed on or after December 15, 2006, the SEC requires firms to include the annual accrual of pension benefits in the Summary Compensation Table, and to disclose the present value of accrued pension benefits in the Retirement Plans Section. These changes are incremental to the earlier disclosure regulations. Under the new regulations, the SEC still does not require firms to disclose lump sum payout options or the existence of Rabbi Trusts and Secular Trusts. Appendix B presents the new disclosure requirements.
Hypothesis Development
In this section I develop hypotheses to test the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Views on CEO pensions. Specifically, I develop hypotheses about the discretionary disclosure of pension benefits, the determinants of pension benefits, and the association between pension benefits and excess compensation.
Disclosure Policies
Proponents of the Managerial Power View argue that limited disclosure requirements enable CEOs to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits through discretionary disclosure policies that lead outside observers to make downwardly biased estimates of pension values (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Hodgson 2004; Gordon 2005 This assumption appears valid-large institutional investors pursue proxy voting policies that call for increased pension disclosures and limits on excessive benefit levels. 2 Proponents also assume that the behavior of these outside observers does not lead firms to fully disclose pension benefits. Proprietary costs of disclosure can sustain a discretionary disclosure equilibrium in which firms do not fully disclose pension benefits (Verrecchia 1983) . For example, firms in competitive industries may not disclose information about their top executives' compensation packages, because such disclosures would benefit competitors by providing information on incentives and reservation wages.
A necessary condition for the argument that CEOs exploit limited disclosure requirements to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits is that estimates based on public disclosures are downwardly biased. The first hypothesis, stated in the affirmative, tests this necessary condition.
H1A: Estimates of pension benefits based on public disclosures are downwardly biased.
Downward bias is only a necessary condition because proprietary costs of disclosure can be the sole reason that firms pursue disclosure policies that lead outside observers to make downwardly biased estimates. The Managerial Power View, however, implies that some CEOs use disclosure policies to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits. This leads to the second hypothesis.
H1B: Downward bias increases with excess pension benefits.
Proponents of the Managerial Power View often claim that powerful CEOs pursue disclosure policies that make it difficult to gauge their benefit levels. The role of CEO power, however, in the use of disclosure policies to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits is not clear. Powerful CEOs have greater influence on firm policies and are therefore better able to extract and hide excess pension benefits. But powerful CEOs could be indifferent to whether their rent extraction is observable because outside stakeholders may be unable to constrain the actions of powerful CEOs, implying that weak CEOs may have greater incentives to pursue such policies.
In addition, Singh (2006) shows theoretically that in the presence of director career concerns relatively independent boards reduce the disclosed level of CEO pay to signal independence. I therefore state the following non-directional hypothesis about the relation between CEO power and pension disclosures.
H1C: CEO power is associated with pension disclosure policies.
Determinants of Pension Benefits
Proponents of the Managerial Power View argue that CEOs with power over their boards extract rent in general. According to their argument, however, "outrage costs" arising from the actions of the press, regulators, and institutional investors limit the extent to which CEOs can extract rent through current compensation (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004) . Proponents therefore postulate that powerful CEOs extract rent through pensions because pensions are less observable to outside stakeholders and less sensitive to current performance than other forms of compensation and incentives. Pensions are less observable because they are subject to limited disclosure requirements. Pensions are less sensitive to current performance because final average earnings and tenure determine total pension benefits.
Managerial Power View proponents claim that powerful CEOs either substitute pensions for other forms of compensation and incentives at beneficial rates, or complement other forms of compensation and incentives with pensions. In either case, according to their argument, CEO power is the primary, but not necessarily the sole, determinant of the level and mix of pension benefits in CEO contracts. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H2A: Pension benefits are positively associated with CEO power. 3 Alternatively, and consistent with the Optimal Contracting View, economic models indicate that pension-like mechanisms can enter optimal contracts to address incentive problems when the agent is difficult to monitor, and there are gains from aligning the agent's interests with those of creditors.
Edmans (2006) theoretically investigates whether debt enters the optimal contract in the presence of agency costs of debt and equity. He finds that firms trade off agency costs of debt and equity, and that debt enters CEO contracts when there are incentives to increase firm risk to the detriment of creditors (the "asset substitution problem"). By introducing debt into the CEO's contract, the firm aligns the CEO's interests with those of creditors, and therefore benefits from lower borrowing rates.
Pensions function as debt in CEO contracts because pensions are typically not bankruptcy protected. Consistent with Edmans's prediction, Sundaram and Yermack (2006) find for a sample of 237 large capitalization firms that the level of the CEO's pension benefits is positively associated with the firm's distance from default on its credit obligations. This leads to the following two hypotheses.
H2B: Pensions are positively associated with leverage.
H2C: Pensions are positively associated with higher quality credit ratings. Baber et al. (1996) find that firms with greater investment opportunities use higher levels of equity based compensation and lower levels of accounting based compensation, such as annual bonuses. The annual bonus is a major determinant of final pension benefits, implying that firms with greater investment opportunities provide lower levels of pension benefits. In addition, pensions are typically unfunded, thus introducing debt into the CEO's contract, which can limit the riskiness of the CEO's investment decisions. This implies that firms with greater investment opportunities provide their CEOs with lower levels of pension benefits, leading to the following hypothesis.
H2D: Pensions are negatively associated with investment opportunities.
Another potential contracting benefit of pensions is tax planning (Scholes et al. 2002) .
Pensions represent a tax efficient form of compensation in three situations: when the firm can earn a higher after tax rate of return than the CEO; when the CEO's marginal tax rate decreases during retirement; when the firm's marginal tax rate increases after the CEO retires.
Although pensions can assist in joint tax planning, taxes do not appear to be a major determinant of CEO pensions. First, CEO pensions are primarily non-qualified and therefore do not provide firms with immediate tax deductions. Second, unlike deferred compensation plans, the firm's after tax rate of return does not directly affect pension benefits. Third, the highest marginal tax rate applies to income over $326,449, which is probably below the pre-pension retirement income of most S&P 500 CEOs. Finally, if taxes drive pension benefits, then there should be introductions and terminations of pension plans related to changes in tax rates.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that firms do not introduce pensions in anticipation of increasing marginal tax rates. sharing, and retirement planning. Retention does not appear to be a major pension determinant for CEOs because they typically hold other long term incentives that are subject to vesting such as stock options. Risk sharing and retirement planning also do not appear to be major pension determinants because CEOs are typically wealthy individuals with access to outside financial planners and services.
Excess Compensation
Ultimately, the Managerial Power View rests on the assumption that pensions allow CEOs to earn excess compensation through rent extraction. Even if disclosures lead to biased estimates of pension values, and pension benefit levels are higher than expected, these facts have little impact on shareholders if they do not lead to excessive total compensation. In addition, the labor economics literature finds evidence that pensions can complement and substitute for other forms of compensation, implying that pensions should not be investigated in isolation (McGill 2004) .
To the extent that the Managerial Power View is descriptive, pensions should be associated with excess compensation, leading to the following hypothesis.
H3: Pension benefits are positively associated with excess compensation.
Samples and Research Design

Samples
I use two samples in the empirical analyses. The first sample consists of a proprietary data set of 172 publicly traded firms. A major compensation consultant surveyed these firms about the retirement benefits they provide to their top executives. The data are from fiscal 2003 and include pension plan information that firms are not required to disclose. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for this proprietary sample. In untabulated analyses, I find that responding firms are similar in size to firms on the S&P 500 Index (of which two-thirds of this sample are members), but tend to have fewer investment opportunities.
The second sample consists of firms in the S&P 500 Index for either fiscal 2004, fiscal 2005, or both. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for this sample.
Pension Valuations
I calculate the value of two life annuities for firms in the proprietary sample. For all firms in this sample, I calculate the first annuity based on actual plan details. For the firms that provide lump sum payouts but do not disclose, I calculate the second life annuity based on public disclosures. To value the second annuity, I use the firm's cost of debt and the Social Security Life Expectancy Table. To proxy for the cost of debt, I use the ten year corporate bond rate associated with the firm's S&P Long Term Debt Rating. Consistent with Sundaram and Yermack (2006) , unrated firms are assumed to have a AAA rating. I assume that CEOs retire at the age specified by the plan. CEOs who are older than the plan specified age are assumed to retire at fiscal year end.
To value pension benefits for the S&P 500 sample, I estimate the CEO's annual retirement payment from the firm's proxy statements for fiscal 2004 and 2005 . I calculate the value of four life annuities using two retirement age assumptions (62 and 65) and two mortality table assumptions (the Social Security Administration Life Expectancy Table and the 1983 General Annuitants' Mortality Table [" 
Asset Substitution Problem
I create two measures meant to assess asset substitution problems. First, incentives for CEOs and shareholders to increase firm risk at the expense of creditors are assumed to be positively correlated with the firm's leverage ratio (Gavish and Kalay 1983; Green and Talmor 4 The 1983 GAM is the most common mortality table used by firms in the proprietary sample. 14 1986). To measure leverage ratios, I calculate LEVERAGE, which is the ratio of short and long term debt to the book value of total assets. Second, I use the firm's S&P Long Term Debt Rating to estimate default risk. I create indicator variables for the various ratings (AAA/AA, A, BBB, and JUNK) to control for nonlinearities in default probabilities. AAA and AA are combined because there are only eight AAA firms in the S&P 500 for 2004 and six for 2005. I make two assumptions about the association between the asset substitution problem and the firm's default risk: firms with higher default risk have greater incentives to engage in asset substitution; firms with lower default risk take actions to minimize the potential for asset substitution and therefore benefit from lower borrowing costs.
Investment Opportunities
To measure investment opportunities I create four variables. First, firms with greater investment opportunities are assumed to have higher levels of uncertainty. To measure uncertainty I create IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK, which is the residual from a market model regression estimated over the 24 prior months. Second, investment opportunities are assumed to be negatively associated with the ratio of the book value of assets to the market value of assets, BOOK TO MARKET. Third, firms with greater investment opportunities are assumed to make greater investments in research and development. R&D is the ratio of the research and development expenditures to total assets. Finally, firms with greater investment opportunities are assumed to have lower levels of fixed investments. To measure the level of a firm's fixed investments, I create PP&E, which is the ratio of the net value of property, plant, and equipment to total assets.
CEO Power
I create proxies to measure the following three dimensions of CEO power: anti-takeover charter amendments, institutional investor ownership, and board characteristics. CEOs of firms with more anti-takeover charter amendments are assumed to exercise greater power because they are insulated from the discipline provided by the market for corporate control. Consistent with this assumption, prior literature finds that CEOs of firms with more anti-takeover charter amendments have higher compensation and lower equity incentives (Borokhovich et al. 1997; Fahlenbrach 2002) . To measure protection from the market for corporate control, I use GINDEX, which is the simple sum of the firm's anti-takeover protections (Gompers et al. 2003 ). This variable is taken from the IRRC Governance database.
Prior literature finds that institutional investors influence CEO compensation and turnover (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Parrino et al. 2003; Almazan et al. 2005) . To measure the level and quality of institutional investor influence, I use BLOCKHOLDERS, the number of institutional investors holding 5% or more of the firm's common shares outstanding.
Institutional ownership is taken from the CDA/Spectrum database of 13Fs.
The board of directors hires the CEO, provides direct monitoring of the CEO, negotiates the CEO's contract, and has authority to fire. Therefore, CEOs with more power over the board have more leeway to influence firm disclosure policies, and dictate their compensation and benefit packages.
I use five proxies to measure the CEO's power over the board. CHAIR is an indicator variable coded as one if the CEO chairs the board, and zero otherwise. CEOs who are also chairs are assumed to be relatively more powerful because they can set the board's agenda (Finkelstein and DʹAveni 1994) . BOARD SIZE is the natural logarithm of the number of directors.
CEOs of firms with larger boards are assumed to have more power because of increased coordination costs (Yermack 1996) . INSIDE DIRECTORS is the percentage of insiders on the board, with a higher percentage of insiders expected to increase CEO power because CEOs have more influence over the careers of insiders (Byrd and Hickman 1992) . DIRECTOR AGE is the mean age of the board. Older directors are assumed to be less effective in monitoring, providing the CEO with more power (Core et al. 1999) . Finally, INTERLOCKS is the number of director interlocks on the board, with interlocked directors assumed to be less effective monitors because of reciprocal relations (Hallock 1997). I hand collect CHAIR from proxy statements and take the remaining board variables from the IRRC Directors database.
One criticism of these proxies is that they do not fully capture the CEO's power at the initiation of the pension plan. This point does not take into account that boards can and do renegotiate pension plans that are not trust protected. Another criticism of these proxies is that they represent CEO quality and should therefore be positively associated with compensation and benefit levels. Core et al. (1999) find, however that excess compensation determined by similar measures is associated with operating and stock return underperformance, suggesting that these proxies capture CEO power. 
Control Variables
To control for proprietary costs of disclosure I calculate COMPETITION, which is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the firm's industry (six digit NAICS). The Index is estimated on the entire Compustat population. Firms in more competitive industries are assumed to incur greater costs from disclosing proprietary details of the CEO's contract. Firm performance can affect the level of pension benefits because pensions are partially a function of salary plus bonus. To control for performance, I use two variables: ROA is the ratio of net income to the book value of assets; RETURNS is the return on common equity for the prior fiscal year.
Finally, two additional variables control for other factors that can affect pension benefits.
I create CEO AGE because pension benefits increase monotonically in age up to the plan's retirement age. In addition, to the extent that age is correlated with outside wealth, this variable controls for the effect of outside wealth on the CEO's compensation package. The final variable, Ln(ASSETS), controls for size effects.
Results
I carry out five sets of empirical tests. The first set examines on a univariate basis discretionary disclosures of pension plan characteristics, and biases in estimates of pension values based on public disclosures. The second set of tests examines the determinants of pension benefits. In the third set of tests I investigate whether pensions are associated with excess compensation. The fourth set examines the determinants of the provision and disclosure of pension plan details. The final set of tests investigates the determinants of bias in estimates of pension values based on public disclosures.
Plan Characteristics and Disclosure
I first investigate the Managerial Power View argument that firms provide limited disclosures of pension plan characteristics, and that these disclosures lead to downwardly biased estimates of pension values. Of the 172 firms in the proprietary sample, 99 (58%) allow the CEO to take a lump sum payout at retirement. Of these 99 firms, 38 (38% of the firms that provide lump sum payouts) disclose in their proxy statements that they provide lump sum payouts. Of the 38 firms that do disclose, only one firm discloses the relevant discount rate. No firm discloses the relevant mortality table. Discretionary disclosure extends to protections. Of the 62 (36% of the proprietary sample) firms that provide their CEO with either a Rabbi or a Secular trust, only six firms (10% of the firms that protect) disclose this provision.
For the 61 firms in the proprietary sample that provide but do not disclose lump sum payouts, Table 3 Panel B presents descriptive statistics of the differences between pension valuations based on public disclosures and valuations based on actual plan data. Differences are defined as bias, with negative differences representing downward bias in estimates based on public disclosures. 5 For this sub-sample, estimates based on public disclosures are on average downwardly biased, but the biases are relatively small. Although the minimum is -$3.462 million (-29.32% of actual benefits), the mean is -$593.96 thousand (-7.50%), which is less than the sub-sample's mean annual salary of $1.0 million. 6 Moreover, some firms pursue disclosure policies that lead to overestimates of pension benefits-the maximum difference is $4.182 million (37.98%).
In summary, I find that some firms' disclosure policies do not provide complete information about the CEO's pension plan, and that these disclosure policies are associated with downwardly biased estimates of pension benefits. My results, however, do not support the hypothesis that estimates of pension values based on public disclosures are downwardly biased-relative to annual salary, bias is economically insignificant. In addition, the evidence suggests that the new SEC disclosure requirements are likely to have little impact on investors' ability to value pensions.
Pension Benefit Levels
I next examine the determinants of pension benefit levels. Given the small differences between public and proprietary pension valuations found in the preceding analyses, I assume that public disclosures are adequate to estimate pension benefits. This assumption allows me to increase the sample size and consequently the power of empirical tests. 5 Note that bias represents an underestimate of the present value of accrued pension benefits as opposed to the annual accrual of pension benefits. 6 Biases are primarily driven by differences between the plan's discount rate and the firm's cost of debt. Mean bias based solely on differences in discount rates is -$435 thousand (-7.50%). Table 4 The dependent variable for the Tobit and Truncated Regression models is the natural logarithm of accrued benefits plus one. I use the natural logarithm because the distribution of pension benefits is skewed. The dependent variable in the Probit models is an indicator variable set equal to one if the CEO receives pension benefits, and zero otherwise.
First, I estimate the following specification to determine the ability of controls and contracting determinants to explain cross-sectional variation in pension benefit levels: For the asset substitution measures, I find that firms with higher quality debt ratings are more likely to provide pension benefits. Firms with AAA, AA, or A debt ratings are 24% more likely to provide their CEOs with a pension. Although the coefficients on LEVERAGE, BBB, and JUNK are positive as predicted, they are not significant at the 0.10 level. These findings suggest either that firms with higher quality debt ratings provide pensions to mitigate asset substitution problems, or that CEOs of firms with higher quality debt ratings are more likely to accept Inconsistent with Tobit and Probit, none of the asset substitution measures are associated with the level of pension benefits, conditional on their provision. These findings imply that although asset substitution is associated with the existence of a pension, size and growth opportunities determine the level of pension benefits.
Next, I estimate the following specification to determine the ability of CEO power measures to explain cross-sectional variation in pension benefits holding firm-level economic factors constant: 
Pension Benefits and Excess Compensation
I now investigate the Managerial Power View argument that pensions are associated with total excess compensation. The first model presented in Table 5 Both models provide significant explanatory power. The Adjusted R 2 s are 0.22 and 0.24.
Ln(ASSETS)
and PP&E are positive and significant in both models, implying that the annual pension accrual increases in firm size and fixed investments. CEO AGE is also positive and significant in both models, implying that the annual pension accrual increases in CEO age. In the second model, RETURNS is positive and significant, suggesting that the annual pension accrual increases with firm performance. LEVERAGE is negative and significant in both models.
This suggests either that CEOs of highly levered firms are less likely to accept pension benefits, or pension benefits constrain CEOs from increasing firm leverage. Consistent with Table 4 Panel B, AAA/AA is positive and significant, implying that CEOs of firms with high quality debt ratings receive higher annual pension accruals.
EXCESS COMPENSATION is positive and significant in both models. One dollar of excess compensation is associated with between $0.16-0.23 of accrued pension benefits. In the second model, BOARD SIZE is positive and significant and INSIDE DIRECTORS is negative and significant, implying that, controlling for excess compensation, CEO power provides additional explanatory power for the annual pension accrual.
Results of this section support the Managerial Power View argument that pensions are associated with excess compensation-$1.00 of excess compensation is associated with a $0.16-0.23 increase in the present value of accrued pension benefits. This rate, however, implies that a significant amount of rent extraction is in the form of compensation that is subject to higher levels of disclosure than pensions. For example, on average a $1.00 increase in excess nonpension compensation is associated with an approximate $0.01 increase in the annual retirement payment provided by a pension. 10
Determinants of Plan Disclosures
I now investigate the Managerial Power View argument that firms use limited disclosure to hide and/or camouflage relevant pension plan characteristics. Table 6 presents two Logistic regressions that investigate the disclosure of lump sum payout options and plan protections (Rabbi or Secular trust). These regressions are estimated on firms in the proprietary sample that provide lump sum payout options and plan protections. The regressions use the following specification:
The dependent variable for disclosure of lump sum payouts is an indicator variable for whether the firm discloses the lump sum payout option in its proxy statement, conditional on provision. The independent variables are measures of excess pension benefits, industry competition, and CEO power. I include a measure of industry competition to control for proprietary costs of disclosure, and I also include CEO power measures to investigate whether power is associated with disclosure policies. A measure of excess pension benefits is included to investigate whether disclosure policies are used to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits. I estimate excess pension benefits as the residuals from a benchmark model based on the specifications used in Table 4 Panel B. The benchmark model is estimated on the entire proprietary sample and includes firm controls, asset substitution measures, investment opportunity measures, and CEO power measures.
The dependent variable for protection disclosure is an indicator variable for whether the firm discloses in its proxy statement that it protects the CEO's pension, conditional on protecting the plan. The independent variables are measures of excess pension benefits, industry competition, and CEO power. I include a measure of excess pension benefits to investigate whether excess pension benefits are associated with less disclosure. A measure of industry competition is included to control for proprietary costs of disclosure, and CEO power measures are included to investigate whether power is associated with disclosure policies.
Although correct classification rates range from 63.12% to 90.70%, none of the regressions are significant at the 0.05 level. In addition, none of the coefficients are significant at the 0.10 level.
Overall, I find that although firms exercise discretion in the disclosure of lump sum payouts and protections, disclosure policies are not associated with excess pension benefits, CEO power measures, and/or industry competition. The evidence provides no support for the Managerial Power View argument that firms use disclosure policies to hide and/or camouflage relevant pension plan characteristics and excess pension benefits. Finally, in untabulated analyses I find no evidence that the provisions of lump sum payouts and plan protections are associated with CEO power and/or excess pension benefits.
Determinants of Bias
Although I find in Section 5.1 that bias is on average economically insignificant, bias may vary systematically with excess pension benefits and/or CEO power. To investigate this possibility, Table 7 presents two OLS models estimated on firms in the proprietary sample that provide but do not disclose lump sum payouts.
The dependent variable in the first regression is the dollar value of the bias in pension estimates based on public disclosures and in the second regression it is the percentage of bias.
The independent variables include measures of excess pension benefits, industry competition, and CEO power. The excess pension measure is the same as that used in section 5.4. I include a measure of industry competition to control for proprietary costs of disclosure. Ln(ASSETS) and CEO AGE are also included to control for size and age effects. The specification for both regressions is as follows:
The small sample size of 50 observations limits the power of the two regressions. 11 The Adjusted R 2 s and p values are 0.13 and 0.12 for the dollar bias, and -0.02 and 0.59 for percent bias.
11 The sample size is less than the 61 firms presented in Table 3 Panel B because governance variables are missing for nine firms. In addition, I remove two observations with extreme DFFITS (Belsley et al. 1980) .
As predicted by the Managerial Power View, the coefficient on EXCESS PENSION in both OLS regressions is negative, but not significant. As predicted by the discretionary disclosure literature, the coefficient on COMPETITION is positive in both regressions, but also not significant. Bias using either regression is associated with CEO power, but in a direction opposite to that predicted by the Managerial Power View. The coefficients on INSIDE DIRECTORS are positive and significant, implying that a 1.00% increase in inside directors above the industry mean is associated with a $42.8 thousand overestimate of pension benefits.
This result is consistent with Singh (2006), who shows analytically that in the presence of director career concerns captured boards are less likely to lower the level of disclosed pay.
OLS measures mean effects. To investigate effects for CEOs with extreme downward bias, I compare, in untabulated univariate analyses, firms in the quartile of highest downward bias to the firms in the remaining quartiles. The only difference between the two groups is that firms in the highest quartile of downward bias have fewer inside directors.
Overall, my results provide no support for the hypothesis that disclosure is used to hide and/or camouflage excess pension benefits-neither discretionary disclosure nor bias is associated with excess pension benefits. Bias is associated with CEO power but in a direction opposite to that predicted by the Managerial Power View-inside directors are associated with disclosure policies that lead to upwardly biased estimates of pension benefits.
Summary and Conclusion
I investigate the extent to which the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Views of pensions are descriptive of CEO pensions. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which discretionary disclosures are associated with excess pension benefits, and the relation between pensions and CEO power and/or contracting determinants. I also examine whether pensions are associated with excess total compensation.
My results provide some support for both the Managerial Power and Optimal
Contracting Views. Economic contracting variables, however, appear to explain the crosssectional variation in pension benefit levels to a greater extent than CEO power measures.
Although pension benefit levels are associated with CEO power measures, the direction of coefficients is often opposite to that predicted by the Managerial Power View. Finally, neither CEO power measures nor excess pension benefits are associated with discretionary pension disclosures.
Overall, this evidence suggests that pensions may be used for rent extraction in some cases, but the practice appears to be limited. In addition, my disclosure results suggest that rent extraction can be detected using public disclosures, implying that recent SEC changes in pension disclosure requirements are likely to have little effect on investors' ability to value pensions.
The results of this study must be interpreted in light of endogeneity. Disclosures, pensions, compensation, and equity incentives represent choices of both the CEO and the board of directors. In addition, empirical proxies used in this study are undoubtedly measured with error. Therefore, estimates can suffer from endogeneity biases that affect inferences.
Currently, I am extending my research on CEO pensions on several dimensions. First, I
am investigating whether prior to retirement CEOs with pensions are more likely to manage earnings than CEOs without pensions. Second, I am using the recent SEC changes in pension 31 disclosure requirements to investigate the treatment effect of mandatory disclosure. Finally, I
am investigating whether CEOs tradeoff compensation for benefits such as pensions. DATA6) . BOOK TO MARKET is the ratio of the book value of assets to the market value of assets (DATA6/(DATA199*DATA25+DATA181)). R&D is the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets (DATA46/DATA6). PP&E is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets (DATA8/DATA6). IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK is the residual from a market model estimated over the preceding 24 months. COMPETITION is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the firm's industry (six digit NAICS). LEVERAGE is the ratio of long and short term debt to the book value of total assets ((DATA9+DATA34)/DATA6). AAA/AA, A, BBB, and JUNK are indicator variables for the firm's S&P Long Term Debt Rating (SPDRC). GINDEX is the firm's G Score, which is the simple sum of the firm's antitakeover protections (Gompers et al. 2003) . BLOCKHOLDERS is the number of institutional investors that hold 5% or more of the firm's common shares outstanding. CHAIR is an indicator for whether the CEO chairs the board. BOARD SIZE is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. INSIDE DIRECTORS is the percent of directors who are insiders. DIRECTOR AGE is the mean director age. INTERLOCKS is the number of director interlocks. This table presents the disclosure of plan options and bias in estimates of pension benefits based on public disclosures for the proprietary sample. Panel A presents tabulations of how many firms provide lump sum payouts and protections (Rabbi and Secular trusts) and, conditional on provision, how many firms disclose in proxy statements. Panel B presents the distribution of bias. For firms that provide lump sum payouts but do not disclose in public filings, I calculate bias as the difference between an estimate based on public disclosures and the value of pension benefits based on actual plan details. The top of the table presents the distribution of bias as both the dollar difference and the dollar difference deflated by the actual plan value. Negative values represent the extent to which estimates based on public disclosures are downwardly biased. th percentile of pension benefits for fiscal 2004 to firms in the S&P 500 and to those firms in the S&P 500 that provide pension benefits. I report industry adjusted means for the CEO power measures except for CHAIR. This table presents analyses of the determinants Lump Sum payout and Protection (Rabbi and Secular trusts) disclosures for the proprietary sample. The dependent variable for the Lump Sum logistic regression is an indicator variable for whether conditional on providing a lump sum payout option the firm discloses in its proxy statement. The dependent variable for the Protection logistic regression is an indicator variable for whether conditional on protecting the plan the firm discloses in its proxy statement. EXCESS PENSION is the residual from a pension benchmark model based on the specifications used in Table 4 . I include contracting determinants in the pension benchmark model and estimate the benchmark model on the entire proprietary sample. I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, INSIDE DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR AGE, and INTERLOCKS. Table 1 provides definitions of the remaining variables. This table presents analyses of the determinants of bias in estimates of pension benefits based on public disclosures. The bottom of the table presents two OLS regressions that investigate the determinants of bias. I drop two outliers with extreme DFFITS (Belsley et al. 1980) . EXCESS PENSION is the residual from a pension benchmark model based on the specifications used in Table 4 . I include contracting determinants and CEO power measures in the pension benchmark model and estimate it on the entire proprietary sample. I industry adjust the following variables: GINDEX, BLOCKHOLDERS, BOARD SIZE, INSIDE DIRECTORS, DIRECTOR AGE, and INTERLOCKS. Tables 1 and 2 provide definitions of the independent variables.
